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Where’s Howard?1 
By Guy Standing 
Thanks are due to the three readers who took the trouble to read and comment on The 
Precariat. One of the features of that fascinating masque Comus is that Milton gave the devil 
the best lines. The best critiques are those that represent the author correctly, and I would like 
particularly to thank Jorg Wiegratz for trying to do that. 
Jo Grady ends her critique by citing a pub doorman, Howard, but one really wonders if she 
described the precariat in a way that I, or the many people who have told me they belong to 
it, would have done, or if she described it in a neutral tone. And one wonders if he responded 
in the way stated. Anyhow, that is all clean fun.  
One suspects that the definition of the precariat was not correctly conveyed to Howard, since 
Grady herself seems to think that the main characteristic is ‘employment insecurity’, which is 
not the case. In her critique, it is also regrettable that the positive, radical or transformative 
characteristics of the precariat do not receive a mention. Nor can I recall saying anywhere 
that the precariat is ‘replacing’ the proletariat; the two will continue to co-exist, although the 
one is growing, the other shrinking. Rightly or wrongly, the book states that the proletariat 
will not disappear. 
However, it is to waste of scarce space to dissect textual inaccuracies. I want to use this 
response to summarise the key arguments as developed through a series of books, bearing in 
mind that The Precariat was, as Wiegratz recognises, an attempt to write a narrative 
accessible to a lay audience – most notably to those in or fearful of joining the precariat – as 
much as to academics, drawing on more than a decade of conceptual and empirical research, 
cited in the book’s bibliography. 
Defining the Precariat as a Class-in-the-Making 
For better or for worse (and clearly Grady and Katherine Lawlor think for the worse), the 
underlying objective of my work over the past twenty years has been to escape from the 
suffocating paradigms of what I call labourism and neo-liberalism, as well as from the sterile 
dualism that has characterised quasi-Marxian labour process analysis of the SWP variety.  
While one is bound to be only partially successful at best, what one can say is that the 
concept and the book must have something going for them because I have received thousands 
of emails, letters, phone calls, invitations to speak, and blogs from a wide range of people in 
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numerous countries, many testifying to their personal identification with the precariat. As 
evidence, that may not be much better than Grady’s friend Howard. But as I have put it in a 
number of public gatherings of those describing themselves as in the precariat, “there is 
something in the water”. 
Intellectually, one can define the precariat – and the other groups outlined in the class 
framework – as having a combination of distinctive relations of production, distinctive 
relations of distribution and distinctive relations to the state.     
The first has received most attention from critics, many of whom stop at that point. The 
distinctive relations of production start with the absence of all seven forms of labour-based 
security listed on page 10 of the book and mapped in statistical detail in preceding academic 
books, journal articles and ILO reports. Wiegratz, having read my earlier defence against the 
type of charges made by Lawlor in her final acerbic comments, poses an important question 
in asking how a multi-disciplinary team would investigate the matter. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, within the ILO, I designed and implemented large-scale surveys, 
called Enterprise Labour Flexibility Surveys (ELFS) and People’s Security Surveys (PSS), in 
trying to do precisely that. These were conducted in thousands of firms and, in the case of the 
PSS, covered many thousands of workers in 20 countries. I would be the first to admit to 
shortcomings, but they were the most detailed statistical attempts to capture the changing 
nature of labour relations of which I am aware. Identifying the growth of workers with 
insecure labour relations of many types fed into a detailed empirical book (1999) and a 
comprehensive ILO Report (2004) that the author coordinated and prepared.   
I will not repeat findings from those years of trial-and-error. But surely critics should be 
fairer to colleagues than rely on talks with Howard for their opinions of somebody’s work. 
We all have access to the web and can consult it to discover a work’s antecedents. This is 
also one reason why these days it is less important to give a source for every stylised fact 
given in a text, because with a few taps on the computer one can identify a source for a stated 
fact or finding. Had Lawlor done that in connection with the book’s statement on charity staff 
leaving supermarket jobs to escape stress, she would have found that it came from a Unison 
report. Lawlor is an expert on Michel Foucault. Had the strict criteria she advocates been 
applied to his work, he would never have published anything.
2
  
Anyhow, insecure labour in a contractual sense is not the fundamental point. Critics of the 
concept of the precariat have dismissed it on the grounds that there has always been 
precarious labour. Do they really think one does not know that? The point is that in the case 
of the precariat this feature is combined with other factors in a way that is not what 
precarious labour was in the 19
th
 century. That at least is the hypothesis, to be refuted or 
refined through subsequent research.
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Perhaps the characteristic that resonates most with members of the precariat is the absence of 
occupational identity, the inability to define and retain control over an occupational narrative 
or trajectory. That goes with growing statistical evidence of a low and declining level of 
social mobility. The analogy of a lottery society, of winner-takes-all, loser-loses-all markets 
is increasingly apt.  
At risk of castigation for over-generalisation, one may suggest that in the early days of 
industrial capitalism, a docker or a miner may have had casual labour, but he was probably 
regularly a docker or miner or steelworker. The precariat typically cannot give himself or 
herself a clear occupational identity, knowing that whatever is cited today is likely to change 
within months, weeks or even days. 
The matter does not stop there. The precariat is also distinguished from the proletariat by 
having to do a great deal more work-for-labour relative to labour, and is typically exploited 
off formal workplaces and outside the bounds of formal, remunerated labour, as well as on 
workplaces and during remunerated labour. By contrast, the proletariat, in modal terms, was 
and is exploited on the workplace during designated working hours, clocking in and clocking 
out. 
In that regard, it was pleasing to see Wiegratz’s focus on precariatisation, because that 
contrasts with the well-established concept of proletarianisation, so brilliantly analysed by the 
great historians of the rise of industrial capitalism, most notably E.P.Thompson.  
The rising amount of work-for-labour (and work-for-state) being forced on the precariat is 
why the book suggests a need to move away from the imagery of industrial time to one of 
tertiary time. Rightly or wrongly, this concept is presented as central to understanding the 
precariat, and it regrettable that some critics seem not to notice it at all, even though a whole 
chapter is devoted to it.  
There is another aspect of the distinctive relations of production that does seem to be 
historically unique, and which, incidentally, seems open to good multi-disciplinary Ph.D. 
research. The claim, or hypothesis, is that the precariat is the first mass class in history that is 
expected to have a level of qualifications (or that under-theorised notion of “skill”) greater 
than the level of labour it is expected to undertake. One would be prepared to bet that Howard 
would recognise himself if Grady had described the precariat in those terms. In Marxian 
terms, his labour power was being debilitated by his labour. 
This feature has a series of implications for research and social and labour market policy. The 
book hypothesises that it creates deep alienation, status frustration and different forms of 
relative deprivation, in different ways for the several factions within the precariat. It also 
generates several types of precarity trap, a theme developed more in a new book, A Precariat 
Charter: From Denizens to Citizens.          
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The second defining dimension of the precariat is that it has distinctive relations of 
distribution. As an economist, I have tended to emphasise this aspect. None of the three 
reviewers touches on it. The definition hinges on the concept of social income, explained in 
the book and developed in more detail in the preceding technical books. Perhaps it is because 
she has not come to terms with it that Grady claims that in my class analysis ‘there is no 
consideration as to why anyone who is not the 1% (or perhaps more accurately the 0.01%) 
would support neoliberal capitalism’.  
On the contrary. It is because the structure of social income (as well as its level) varies so 
much that one can make sense of the emerging class structure and the political orientations of 
its components. The plutocracy and elite, clearly earning all their income from capital and 
rental income, are financially advantaged by the neo-liberal model. But so too are large and 
growing parts of the salariat and the proficians, which is one reason for differentiating them 
from the old proletariat.  
Today, in the USA, for instance, salaried employees in corporations on average receive about 
a third of their social income from capital, in the form of shares and profit-sharing bonuses. 
In Germany, the estimated equivalent is about 40%. If they perceive a direct trade-off 
between wages and profits and that a growing part of their income will come from profits, 
they will tend to support policies and institutional changes that will push down wages, if they 
are motivated by short-term material interest.  
Proficians, even more so, depend on profits and the ability of corporations and bureaucracies 
to pay for consultancies and their fancy projects, as well as rates of return to private 
investments. As a result, being detached from the compensatory mechanisms of the welfare 
state, they will tend to support a neo-liberal agenda of lower direct taxation and a shrinking 
welfare state. There are contradictions in that way of thinking, but one can at least understand 
why they would support a neo-liberal agenda. I cannot think of a way of stating that more 
clearly than is done in the book.   
The different political interests also become clearer when thinking of the changing character 
and structure of both state benefits and enterprise benefits. Under the neo-liberal state, the 
upper-income detached classes and parts of the proletariat benefit enormously from the 
panoply of subsidies built up as incentives and rewards for money-makers. None of these go 
to the precariat, which on the contrary suffers from the deliberate and very systematic erosion 
of rights-based universal benefits and services.  
In short, the claim is this. The precariat is the first mass class that has to rely almost entirely 
on money wages for its social income. If Howard is part of the precariat, he would understand 
that. One wonders if Grady told him that is a defining aspect of the precariat. Cross your 
heart! 
The third defining feature is that the precariat has distinctive relations to the state. This is 
hard to summarise adequately. Wiegratz recognises its significance in the book’s framework, 
but it is not clear if he appreciates the centrality of what is happening. Perhaps I am being 
unfair in concluding that.  
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Here the concept of denizens should help. In the middle ages, a denizen was someone who 
came into a town and was granted by the burghers a range of rights that was more limited 
than granted to the town’s citizens. Later, the term came to be used to describe a contractual 
relation imposed on certain migrants, as an ‘in-between’ civil status. That is still the case, in 
effect. But the precariat is the first class in history that has been subject to a state-led erosion 
of rights, being turned more into denizens.  
In the new book, a more systematic attempt is made to show how the precariat has been 
losing civil, political, cultural, social and economic rights, de jure and de facto. That is quite 
unlike what has been happening to the salariat or proletariat. And in this respect as with the 
others, it can only lead to obfuscation if they are seen as all bundled together in one united 
working class. 
In sum, the precariat can be defined in class terms – by relations of production, relations of 
distribution and relations to the state. This combination produces particular consciousness. At 
present, it is still a class-in-the-making, in that members of it know more about what they are 
against than have a united view of what they want instead. Will it become a class-for-itself? 
And if so, how?  I have tried to answer those questions in A Precariat Charter.     
Trades Unions and the Precariat 
Part of the animosity by some critics with labourist values towards the analysis seems linked 
to the critical comments in the book on trades unions.
4
 As someone who has been a trade 
union member for longer than he cares to admit, and as someone who has been working for 
and with a union for the past fifteen years, I can claim some experience and evidence of 
sympathy. But the industrial trades unions of the 20
th
 century are in deep existential danger. 
Historically, they were a great powerful progressive force from the 19
th
 century into the late 
20
th
 century. But they were trapped by their intrinsic labourism, which is the essence of the 
critique in the previous longer book, Work after Globalization: Building Occupational 
Citizenship. For me symbolically, this was exposed when the international body of trades 
unions refused for years to allow affiliation by SEWA, the association representing women 
outworkers in India. The pretext was that it was not a union because it did not represent and 
bargain on behalf of employees with capital.  
Grady misses a key point in her characterisation of poor Howard in saying he had no ‘job 
security’, when what she almost certainly meant was no employment security. That is crucial 
to understanding the difficulty facing unions. Through the 20
th
 century, after the defeat or 
subordination of craft unionism (symbolised by the amalgamation of the AFL-CIO), unions 
gave priority to employment security and labourist social security rather than to occupational 
security or ‘the right to practise’.  
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They opted for a social compact in which they gained so-called ‘labour rights’ (labour-based 
security) in return for ceding the right to manage to capital, in the process allowing 
management to alter the technical division of labour without much restraint, even if some 
unions sometimes manned the barricades in extremis.  
They thus opposed occupational guilds and its tradition of ‘self-regulation’ and stood by as 
complex neo-liberal state regulation of occupations through licensing, usually via financial 
institutions, has been steadily strengthened. Again symbolically, just as the international 
unions blocked organisations like SEWA from being recognised in the ILO, so they have 
always opposed the presence and legitimation of occupational associations inside its 
umbrella. It is not some critic who is ‘dividing the working class’; it has been deeply divided 
for more than a century, and unions have played a role in that.  
Even today, if unions are confronted by a trade-off between jobs for their members and 
improved benefits for the precariat, their governance structures will push them in one 
direction, whatever rhetoric they might adopt to suggest otherwise. If there is a trade-off 
between jobs and the environment or pollution, they seem invariably to choose the former. 
Regrettably, there are plenty of examples that could be cited. One should not be surprised by 
this or indeed be very critical. Unions have been constructed to represent their members as 
employees bargaining with employers.  
We need unions. But we should not be apologists and claim they represent a united working 
class. It is not united, and they have never actually stood for it. If they had, a regime of work 
rights (including equal rights for women’s work (sic) and the right to practise) would have 
been constructed rather than a so-called labour rights regime.  
Grady claims that ‘trades unions and other mobilising institutions’ were ‘quickly dismissed 
by Standing’. It is hard to understand how anybody could say that and claim to be fair. The 
whole thrust of the argument in The Precariat and, at length, in the last two chapters of the 
book on which it is based is that the emerging global labour market and economic system 
requires a combination of new policies of income security and new forms of representation 
security based on collective Voice institutions. 
Grady further claims that the book ‘ignores the fact that in recent years it has been trades 
unions that have been campaigning on the very issues that Standing claims are central to the 
precariat’. She then lists things not mentioned in The Precariat and omits what is mentioned. 
One wonders if this is a fair way of conducting a critique. 
Grady’s claim provides an excuse to relate an anecdote. In 2012, I was invited to present the 
themes to a trade union leaders’ summer school in the north of England. There were long-
standing friends in the audience; some resentment from older men there, a lot more empathy 
among the younger. Towards the end, I asked rhetorically, ‘Why is it that trades unions over 
the years, and even now, have been among the most vehemently hostile to a basic income?’ 
After all, this is a pivotal proposal in The Precariat.  
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In the discussion group afterwards, a young Italian trades unionist said he had been thinking 
about it. ‘I think I know the reason,’ he said, ‘It is because we would lose control and they 
would not join trades unions.’ I looked at him and said, ‘If you think about it, that is a pretty 
bad statement about trades unions. They should be appealing to people to join for better 
reasons than that.’ I could have added that people with basic security are actually more likely 
to join collective bodies than those without it. 
Grady was unfair. But the good news is that there are signs of change, even if unions are 
having to be dragged out of their labourist bunker. But let us not pretend that they have been 
doing what the precariat wants or what the book advocates.                 
In brief, what is needed is a reinvention of collective association. The way this is presented in 
the books is as a synthesis of the time-honoured occupational guilds, which had their faults as 
well as good qualities, and trades unionism, with all their good qualities without the bad.  
Collective bodies are the very antithesis of neo-liberalism. That is why they are needed now 
as much as ever before. They must be revived in new forms suitable to the globalising labour 
and productive process, reviving and strengthening values of social solidarity and social 
empathy. To do that, they may have to start by accepting that wage bargaining is not the most 
important part of the challenge ahead.                       
Why is the precariat the new dangerous class ? 
A key issue in debates around the precariat relate to its political orientations. Most 
fundamentally, its material foundations give it a sense of alienation from other class interests 
and lead it to reject the old mainstream political traditions, including social democracy as 
developed in the 20
th
 century and neo-liberalism. 
The idea of a dangerous class has historical connections. Essentially, in the way used in the 
book, it means the emerging mass class that rejects the existing social and political order, 
largely because it does not recognise its aspirations and needs as being addressed within that 
order.
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 It does not mean it is prone to violence, crime and drugs, which is how some 
reviewers have presumed.
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This differs from Marx’s definition, in that he saw what he called the lumpen-proletariat as 
entirely negative, being used as strike-breakers and so on. By contrast, today we need terms 
for differentiating between those on the margins of society, socially and economically 
damaged and essentially anomic, and those who are central to the emerging system of 
production and labour and work.  
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The lumpen-precariat is roughly equivalent to Marx’s notion, in that it conveys being a group 
at most helping to prop up an existing order. But a group that drifts into crime and social 
illness is not actually dangerous in the political sense. Lock them up or send them for therapy, 
that can be the moralistic reaction. It does not challenge the legitimacy of the existing order.    
The precariat is a dangerous class-in-the-making because its combination of characteristics 
leads it to reject the old social democratic political strategy and the neo-liberalism that 
predominates within the modern state.  
Some would describe the precariat as apolitical, since almost everywhere voting in 
parliamentary and local authority elections has been falling, mainly among the young. 
Thinning democracy is dangerous. But it favours the neo-liberal model, since the groups that 
favour it have a greater tendency to remain politically engaged in the conventional sense. 
However, if one wishes to be optimistic, one can say that the consequential loss of support for 
labourist and social democratic variants of a leftish politics must sooner or later induce a re-
orientation towards values and aspirations of the precariat. It is this thought that underpins the 
new book, which hinges on the question: How would a Charter of demands by the precariat 
of 2014 differ from a Charter of demands that might have been made by the proletariat in 
1914?      
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